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Abstract
The Lagos-Wright model￿a monetary model in which pairwise
meetings alternate in time with a centralized meeting￿has been exten-
sively analyzed, but always using particular trading protocols. Here,
trading protocols are replaced by two alternative notions of imple-
mentability: one that allows only individual defections and one that
also allows cooperative defections in meetings. It is shown that the
￿rst-best allocation is implementable under the stricter notion with-
out taxation if people are su￿ciently patient. And, if people are free to
skip the centralized meeting, then lump-sum taxation used to pay in-
terest on money does not enlarge the set of implementable allocations.
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1 Introduction
Models in which people meet in pairs are common in monetary economics
and labor economics. In monetary economics, absence-of-double-coincidence
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1situations have almost always been described in terms of such meetings. In
addition, models with pairwise meetings have been useful in applications. 1
However, such models give rise to an old question: how is trade determined
in bilateral-monopoly situations? By far the most common approach is to
assume one or several trading protocols; examples are alternating o￿ers,
take-it-or-leave-it o￿ers, bargaining according to Nash, and posted prices.
Another approach, a kind of mechanism-design approach, explores all imple-
mentable outcomes. Here, we apply the implementability approach to the
Lagos-Wright (2005) model, a model in which pairwise meetings alternate in
time with a centralized meeting in which there is competitive trade.
Lagos-Wright is a convenient model in which to emphasize the di￿er-
ences between the consequences of our implementability approach and the
trading-protocol approach. First, it is known that the model’s implications
for optima￿and, more generally, for the welfare costs of in￿ation￿are sen-
sitive to the trading protocol (see Lagos and Rocheteau 2005, Lagos and
Wright 2005, and Rocheteau and Wright 2005). For example, Lagos and
Wright, using a parameterized version of their model, ￿nd that a 10% in￿a-
tion is equivalent to a 1.4% reduction in consumption under buyer take-it-
or-leave-it o￿ers, as compared with a 3.2% reduction under Nash bargaining.
We provide a more robust analysis by, in e￿ect, searching over all trad-
ing protocols that satisfy some properties. Second, the model has a crucial
simplifying assumption: quasi-linear preferences in the centralized meeting.
That assumption, which is consistent with a degenerate steady-state distri-
bution of money and accounts for the model’s popularity, allows us to say a
lot about the set of implementable outcomes.
We apply two notions of implementability to the model. One notion,
called individually-rational (IR) implementability, requires only that trades
in pairwise meetings be immune to individual defection; the other, called
coalition-proof (CP) implementability, also requires that those trades be im-
mune to cooperative defection by the pair in a meeting. 2 For both notions,
we maintain the competitive trade in the centralized meeting assumed in
Lagos-Wright. Such trade is consistent with CP implementability because
the outcome of competitive trade is the core for such meetings. As between
1For example, pairwise meetings are used in a crucial way to generate ￿oat in Wallace
and Zhu (2007).
2Earlier applications of IR implementability in monetary models include Kocherlakota
(1998). One application of CP implementability in monetary models is Deviatov (2006),
who studies optimal in￿ation numerically.
2the two notions, we prefer CP implementability because it is consistent with
exhaustion of the gains from trade in meetings. We follow existing work
by studying the model without and with lump-taxes levied in the central-
ized meeting and used to ￿nance interest on money. The version with taxes
can be used to study the role of the Friedman rule and the welfare costs of
in￿ation.
According to all the previously studied trading protocols in the Lagos-
Wright model, the ￿rst-best allocation is not achievable without the use of
lump-sum taxes. In contrast, we show that the ￿rst-best is CP implementable
without taxes when people are su￿ciently patient. Previous expositions of
the model also show that the ￿rst-best is achievable if buyers make take-it-
or-leave-it o￿ers and if there is lump-sum-tax ￿nanced payment of interest
on money at the Friedman-rule rate. We show that if preferences in the
centralized meeting are linear, rather than quasi-linear, and people are free
to skip the centralized meeting￿an implication of no-commitment by indi-
viduals that has been ignored￿then such a policy does not help; it does
not enlarge even the set of IR implementable allocations. (Although we use
linearity throughout, this is the only result that depends on it.) Finally, as
noted above, previous studies show that the welfare cost of in￿ation varies
greatly with the trading protocol. We characterize the sets of IR and CP
implementable allocations taking as given the in￿ation rate. If we measure
the welfare cost of in￿ation by choosing the best CP implementable alloca-
tion subject to a given in￿ation rate, then we ￿nd an associated welfare cost,
measured relative to the ￿rst best, that is smaller than that found for any
given trading protocol. Indeed, for the Lagos-Wright parameterized version,
in￿ation less than about 16% per year is costless.
2 The environment
Time is discrete, there are two stages at each date, preferences are additively
separable over dates and stages, and there is a nonatomic unit measure of
people who maximize expected discounted utility with discount factor  2
(0;1). The ￿rst stage has pairwise meetings and the second stage has a
centralized meeting. Just prior to the ￿rst stage, a person looks forward
to be being a buyer who meets a seller with probability 1
N, looks forward
to being a seller who meets a buyer with probability 1
N, and looks forward
to no pairwise meeting with probability 1   2
N, where N  2. The stage-1
3utility of someone who becomes a seller and produces y 2 R+ is  c(y), while
that of someone who becomes a buyer and who consumes y is u(y), where
c(0) = u(0) = 0, c and u are strictly increasing and continuous with c convex
and u concave, and u   c is strictly concave.3 Moreover, there exists y > 0
such that c(y) = u(y). There are special preferences for stage 2: the utility
of consuming z amount of the stage-2 good is z. As in Lagos and Wright
(2005), z < 0 is interpreted as production.4
All goods are perishable (both across stages and time), people cannot
commit to future actions, and there is no monitoring (histories are private
information)￿assumptions that serve to make money essential. Money is
divisible, in ￿xed supply, and the per capita amount is normalized to be 1.
Finally, people can hide money and participation in the centralized meeting
is voluntary, voluntariness that matters only when there are lump-sum taxes.
3 Stationary and symmetric allocations
All of our results are about allocations in which consumption and production
are stationary and symmetric in the following way. An allocation is a pair
(y;z) 2 R2
+, where y is stage-1 production and consumption in any buyer-
seller meeting and z is stage-2 production (consumption) in the centralized
meeting of any person who consumed (produced) y at stage 1. Associated
with such (y;z) is zero production and consumption at both stages by those
who didn’t meet anyone at stage 1.
We describe the set (y;z) that is IR implementable and the subset that
is CP implementable. When judging the welfare of (y;z), our criterion is the
payo￿ implied by (y;z) prior to pairwise meetings; namely, h(y) 
u(y) c(y)
N(1 ) .
(Because a person is as likely to produce z as to consume z and because stage
2 utility is linear, the magnitude of z does not appear in this expression.)
The assumed strict concavity of u   c implies that argmax[u(y)   c(y)],
denoted y, is unique, and that h(y) is strictly increasing for y 2 [0;y] and
strictly decreasing for y 2 [y;1). Our assumptions also imply that y > 0.
3The assumption c(0) = u(0) = 0 is without loss of generality. If it does not hold, then
in all the expressions that follow we replace u(y) by u(y)   u(0) and c(y) by c(y)   c(0).
4In Lagos and Wright (2005), the authors assume quasi-linearity and a net gain from
producing z and consuming z for some z. As noted above, only one of our results depends
on our linearity assumption, as opposed to their quasi-linearity assumption.
44 Implementable allocations: zero taxes
Both of our notions of implementability are weak in the sense that when we
say that an allocation is implementable we mean that there exists an equilib-
rium with that allocation as an outcome. We will not be demonstrating that
any equilibrium gives that outcome. In addition, the equilibrium notion we
use relies on anonymity. That is, each person in a pairwise meeting evaluates
the consequences of current actions taking as given that the people each will
meet in the future will have money holdings implied by equilibrium play.
We next describe two games: one for each notion of implementability.
Each game is de￿ned relative to a (planner) proposal. We use M  R+ to
denote the set in which money holdings or money transfers reside; Y  R+
to denote the set in which stage 1 output resides, and Z  R to denote the
set in which stage-2 consumption resides.
De￿nition 1 A proposal consists of three objects: (i) an initial distribution
of money; (ii) a function that describes trades in stage-1 meetings, g : M2 !
Y  M, where the domain is announced money holdings of the buyer and
the seller, respectively, and the range is output (produced by the seller and
consumed by the buyer) and the transfer of money from the buyer to the
seller; (iii) a price of money, denoted p 2 R+, for the stage 2 centralized
meeting.
Notice that we are limiting consideration to g and p that are constant over
time.
Both games have each agent choosing a budget-feasible trade at the price
of money p at stage 2. To deal with the fact that an arbitrary pro￿le of
individual budget-feasible choices is not feasible, we allow the planner to
satisfy stage-2 excess demands by giving the planner unlimited access to
money and access to the same stage-2 linear technology that agents have. 5
Now we describe the sequence of actions in stage 1 meetings, a sequence that
di￿ers for the two games.
5For this setting, it would possible to replace stage-2 competitive trade by a Shapley-
Shubik trading post, Cournot-type game (see Shubik 1973). Because there is a nonatomic
measure of agents, one equilibrium of that game would coincide with competitive equi-
librium. (The existence of other equilibria￿in particular, a no-trade equilibrium￿would
not be a concern because our notions of implementability are weak.) If we did use the
trading-post formulation, then we would have feasibility for any agent choices at stage 2
without involving the planner.
5The IR-game. First, the buyer and seller simultaneously announce their
money holdings. Second, they simultaneously choose from fyes;nog. If both
say yes, then the trade given by the proposal is carried out; otherwise the
meeting is autarkic.
Obviously, the second step insures that any trade that occurs is individually
rational.
The CP-game. First, the buyer and seller simultaneously announce their
money holdings. Second, they simultaneously choose from fyes;nog. If both
say yes, then they go to the next step; otherwise the meeting is autarkic.
Third, the buyer announces a trade and then the seller announces from
fyes;nog. If the seller announces yes, then the buyer’s proposed trade is
carried out; otherwise, the trade in the (planner’s) proposal is carried out. 6
The second step in the CP game insures that each person has the option of
autarky. If the third step is reached, then either the planner’s proposal is
carried out or a trade that Pareto dominates it is carried out. Therefore, if
the planner’s proposal is coalition proof for the pair, then it is carried out. In
that case, there is no bene￿t to the buyer in the third step from proposing.
If the planner’s proposal is not coalition proof, then there is some bene￿t,
but it is constrained by the planner’s proposal.
We focus on simple strategies in these games.









b1 : M ! M is the buyer’s announced money holdings and
st
b2 : M  M ! fyes;nog, where the ￿rst set in the domain is the buyer’s




s2), de￿ned analogously for the seller; and st
c : M ! Z is the choice
of consumption in the centralized meeting (the domain is money holdings at
the start of stage 2).
6This CP game speci￿cation is borrowed from Zhu (2008). Many alternatives would
imply our results. For example, in the last step, the roles of the buyer and seller could be
reversed or there could be random determination of who makes the trade proposal.
7A formal de￿nition of strategies should add the buyer’s announced money holding to
the domain here and in the de￿nition for the CP game that follows. We omit it because
including it would complicate the notation and would not a￿ect the results.








b3), where the ￿rst two components have
domains and ranges as in the IR game and st
b3 : MM ! YM where the
￿rst set in the domain is the buyer’s money holdings and the second is the





s3), where the ￿rst two components have domains and
ranges as in the IR game and where st
s3 : (M  M)  (Y  M) ! fyes;nog
is the seller’s response to the buyer’s proposed trade; and st
c de￿ned as in the
IR game.
Implicit in the above is that a triple (st
b;st
s;st
c) is a strategy only if it
satis￿es the obvious feasibility constraints; in particular, whether making an
announcement, a trade proposal, or a trade, agents cannot overstate money
holdings. These strategies are simple in that they are not contingent on the
agent’s past private history. For the moment, they depend on the date be-
cause we are not building into the de￿nition of equilibrium an unchanged dis-
tribution of money holdings. Notice that the function st
c also determines an
end-of-date money holding because the choice satis￿es the person’s budget at






there are implied money distributions at each date, 't
p before pairwise meet-
ings and 't
c before the centralized meeting, and implied value functions,
wt
p : M ! R before pairwise meetings and wt
c : M ! R before the centralized
meeting.
Finally, we have to introduce buyer and seller beliefs. A belief is t =
(t
b;t
s), where each component maps M (partner’s announced money hold-
ing) to (M), a distribution over partner’s money holding. In the IR-game,
t does not matter because players are concerned only with the planner’s
proposed trade which is completely determined by the reported money hold-
ings. In the CP-game, types also matter because they help determine the
alternative trades that could be carried out.
In terms of the above notation, we have the following de￿nition of an
equilibrium.













that satis￿es (i) (st
b;st
s) is optimal given wt
c and t, and st
c is optimal given
wt+1
p ; (ii) t is implied by 't
p and (st
b;st






7In this de￿nition, we take for granted that the value functions and the
distributions are those implied by the initial condition and the strategies.
As noted above, equilibrium is de￿ned relative to a planner’s proposal which
includes '0
p, the initial condition. Condition (i) is a Nash-like feature, because
checking whether a sequence satis￿es it involves checking whether it holds
for the value functions implied by the sequence. As written, condition (i)
appeals to the one-date deviation principle which, as pointed out below,
applies. Condition (ii) is standard and condition (iii) is feasibility at stage 2
without planner participation.
Throughout we work with a special kind of equilibrium.
De￿nition 5 A simple equilibrium is an equilibrium in which (i) the proposal
has a degenerate initial distribution of money (each person has 1 unit); (ii)
the strategy and belief sequences are constant sequences and imply 't
p = '0
p;
(iii) everyone is truthful, the planner’s proposed trade is carried out, and yes
is always played.
Now we can de￿ne implementability for the stationary and symmetric
allocations introduced in the last section.
De￿nition 6 The allocation (y;z) is IR (CP) implementable if there exists
a simple equilibrium of the IR (CP) game whose outcome is consistent with
(y;z).
An obvious consequence of this de￿nition is that IR implementability is
necessary for CP implementability. We also have the following necessary
condition for IR implementability.
Lemma 1 If (y;z) is IR implementable, then the planner’s proposal satis-
￿es the following conditions: '0
p is degenerate, g(1;1) = (y;1), and p = z.
Moreover, the implied value functions satisfy
w
t
p(1) = h(y) and w
t
c(m) = z(m   1) + w
t
p(1) for m 2 f0;1;2g: (1)
Proof. By de￿nition 6, there exists a simple equilibrium whose out-
come is consistent with (y;z). If the corresponding proposal does not satisfy
g(1;1) = (y;1), then it must satisfy g(1;1) = (y;x), with x < 1. But any
such trade in a simple equilibrium implies that people enter stage 1 with more
money than they will spend, even if they are buyers. This violates optimal
8stage-2 choice at the previous date because linearity of stage-2 utility and
discounting implies that any such person is better o￿ entering stage 1 with
only x amount of money and restoring money holdings at the next stage 2.
With g(1;1) = (y;1), only p = z is consistent with (y;z) and with persis-
tence of the degenerate distribution of money. The value function claims are
obvious.
Our most important results demonstrate implementability of some (y;z).
For such su￿ciency-like results, the restriction to simple equilibria is with-
out loss of generality. The crucial part of the proof for each such result is
the construction of the (planner’s) proposal. The on-equilibrium parts of
the proposal are in lemma 1. That is, the seller produces y and the buyer
transfers all money held. And at p = z, agents make choices that restore
the degenerate distribution and, as a consequence, are feasible. The main
e￿ort in our su￿ciency proofs is devoted to constructing g(;1) and g(1;),
the o￿-equilibrium trades. For a simple equilibrium, we do not have to de￿ne
g on other parts of the domain. And for a simple equilibrium, beliefs are easy
to specify. If a money holding equal to unity is announced, then Bayes rule
applies and implies that the announcement is treated as truthful; if a money
holding di￿erent from unity is announced, then any belief can be speci￿ed
because Bayes rule does not apply. The main idea behind the construction
of g(;1) is to punish the buyer with o￿-equilibrium money holdings.
Some of our results demonstrate that some (y;z) are not implementable.
For such necessity-type results, the restriction to simple equilibria may have
bite. That is, for such results, we establish only that there is no simple
equilibrium with an outcome consistent with (y;z). And we do that by
describing some feasible defections from a simple equilibrium.
5 Results: zero taxes











N(1   ) + 
. (3)
9Because welfare depends only on y, it is useful to describe the projection
of V on y; namely, the interval [0;ymax], where ymax is the unique posi-
tive solution for y to c(y) = Ru(y). (If y is such that c(y)  Ru(y), then
[c(y);Ru(y)] is not empty and (y;z) with z 2 [c(y);Ru(y)] is in the set V .
And if (y;z) 2 V , then y 2 [0;ymax].) Moreover, the optimum in [0;ymax]￿
namely, argmaxy2[0;ymax] h(y)￿is minfymax;yg.8 And, because R ! 1 as
 ! 1, [0;ymax] includes y, the ￿rst best, for all su￿ciently high ￿all
  
, where 






We start by characterizing the set of IR implementable allocations.
Proposition 1 There exists z such that (y;z) is IR implementable if and
only if y 2 [0;ymax].
Proof. Necessity. At stage 1, defection to no-trade by a seller with 1
unit of money assures a payo￿ no less than wc(1), while following g(1;1) =
(y;1) gives the seller  c(y) + wc(2). Thus, it must be the case that
c(y)  wc(2)   wc(1) = z, (4)
where the equality follows from (1) (see lemma 1). This is the ￿rst inequality
that de￿nes V .
Next, consider an agent who enters stage 2 with 0 money. By lemma 1,
this agent’s payo￿ is  z + wp(1). However, it is feasible for this agent to
produce 0 at stage 2 and resume feasible equilibrium actions starting at the
next date. This possibility and IR implementability give the inequality








where the righthand side is the payo￿ from the above defection. But, by
lemma 1, this inequality is equivalent to










Using the de￿nition of h(y), this is easily seen to be the second inequality
that de￿nes V .
8The interval [0;ymax] is the set that can be implemented with perfect monitoring (with
a defector punished by permanent autarky) in a version of the model in which stage 2 does
not exist.
10Su￿ciency. Our candidate for completion of the planner’s proposal is
g(1;m) = (y;1) for all m and g(m;1) =

(y;1) if m  1
(0;0) if m < 1 ; (7)
where, recall, the ￿rst argument of g is the buyer’s announced money holding
and the second is the seller’s. (Notice that a buyer with less than 1 unit is
punished by no trade.) We also propose that an equilibrium strategy has
sc(m) (consumption at stage 2) such that each person, with arbitrary m,
leaves stage 2 with 1 unit of money.
If the above trades are carried out, then the initial degenerate distribution
persists and the value functions are
























+ h(y) if m  1
: (9)
To complete the proof, we have to show that these induce truth-telling
and playing yes at stage 1 and induce the proposed stage-2 strategy. 9
Given g in (7), truthfulness is a weakly dominant strategy for everyone.
Now we show that a buyer with m  1 says yes and that any seller says yes.
(For buyers with m < 1, either action implies no trade.) For the former, we
need to show that u(y) + wc(m   1)  wc(m) or by (8) that u(y)  z. This
follows from the second inequality that de￿nes V . For the latter, we need to
show that  c(y)+wc(m+1)  wc(m) , which is just the ￿rst inequality that
de￿nes V .
Now we show that our stage-2 proposed strategy, sc(m) = z(m   1),
is optimal for agents. We proceed by considering two exhaustive sets of
alternatives.
9This is where we use the principle of one-period deviations. To invoke it, we have
to show that corresponding to any bene￿cial deviation is a ￿nite-period deviation. This
holds provided that period payo￿s for a defector not grow too fast. In our case, period
payo￿s in pairwise meetings are bounded above by u(ymax). As for period payo￿s in the
centralized meeting, they can grow at most arithmetically, by z per date. These imply
that corresponding to any bene￿cial deviation is a ￿nite-period deviation. Given the
￿nite-period deviation, the one-period deviation principle follows by backward induction.
11Case (i): sc(m) < z(m   1). This implies leaving stage 2 with more
than 1 unit of money. However, just as in the proof of lemma 1, this implies
carrying some money from the current stage 2 to the next stage 2, which is
not optimal.
Case (ii): sc(m) > z(m   1). This implies leaving stage 2 with less than
1 unit of money, the amount m   x
z, where, for simplicity, we denote sc(m)


















This expression is linear in x and increasing. Therefore, consistent with not
carrying money that is not spent at stage 1, this person chooses x = zm











We have to show that this is weakly dominated by the payo￿ from choosing
sc(m) = z(m   1), which according to (8) is z(m   1)+ h(y). The required











which, in turn, is equivalent to inequality (6). But, as noted above, inequality
(6) is equivalent to the second inequality that de￿nes V .
Now we characterize the set of CP implementable allocations, which turns
out to be all IR implementable y’s that do not exceed y.
Proposition 2 There exists z such that (y;z) is CP implementable if and
only if y 2 [0;minfymax;yg].
Proof. Necessity. If ymax < y; then any y > ymax is not IR im-
plementable and, hence, is not CP implementable. Thus, suppose that
ymax  y and suppose, by way of contradiction, that (y;z) with y > y
is CP-implementable. We show that the buyer, instead of proposing (y;1),
proposes a smaller trade and that the seller accepts the buyer’s proposal.
12Let  > 0 be such that
u(y   )   c(y   ) > u(y)   c(y): (10)
Such  exists because y > y. It follows that there exists  > 0 such that
c(y)   c(y   ) > z > u(y)   u(y   ): (11)
Then
u(y   ) + wc()  u(y   ) + z(   1) + wp(1) >
u(y)   z + wp(1) = u(y) + wc(0); (12)
where the ￿rst inequality follows from the fact that the buyer can buy 1 unit
of money in the centralized meeting, the second inequality from the second
inequality in (11), and the equality from (1). Following the same logic, we
have
 c(y   ) + wc(2   )   c(y   ) + z(1   ) + wp(1) >
 c(y) + z + wp(1) =  c(y) + wc(2): (13)
Therefore, by (12) and (13) the o￿er (y   ;1   ) Pareto dominates (y;1),
the planner’s proposal, a contradiction.
Su￿ciency. Consider any ~ y 2 (0;minfymax;yg] and let ~ z be such that
(~ y; ~ z) 2 V . Our candidate for the completion of the planner’s proposal is
g(m;m
0) = arg max
(y;x)2R+[0;m]
[ c(y) + ~ zx]
subject to
u(y)   ~ zx  (Im1)(u(~ y)   ~ z) + (Im<1)u(0); (14)
where I is the indicator function. The constraint set in this problem is
not empty and the solution exists and is unique; moreover, the displayed
constraint holds at equality at the solution. (Notice that the problem has
the form of a Pareto problem and that the period return to a buyer with
m 6= 1, a defector, is minimized subject to a lower bound. The lower bound
for m > 1 is that implied by an output trade equal to ~ y, and a transfer of
131 unit of money from the buyer to the seller; the lower bound for m < 1 is
that implied by no trade. The objective is the period return of the seller.)
We ￿rst show that g(1;m0) = (~ y;1). If x = 1, then constraint (14) at
equality implies y = ~ y. Otherwise, the constraint on the trade of money
is not binding. Then, after substituting ~ zx from (14) at equality into the
objective, we see that y is chosen to maximize u(y)   c(y). Hence, y = y.
But, because ~ y  y and x < 1, this means that constraint (14) is slack,
and then the value of the objective can be increased by increasing m, a
contradiction. Thus g(1;m0) = (~ y;1).
Next, we propose equilibrium strategies and beliefs. The stage-1 strate-
gies are dictated by the requirements of a simple equilibrium: agents are
truthful, they say yes to any proposal, and the buyer proposes the planner’s
proposal. The strategy in the centralized meeting, sc, is such that any agent
leaves with 1 unit of money. For beliefs, we assume that reports are believed.
Notice that Bayes rule only applies to reports that say that 1 unit of money
is held.
Given the proposals and the strategies, we can calculate the value func-
tions. It follows that wc(m) is given by (8) and that wp(m) is given by (9),
where the latter is a consequence of the binding constraint in the problem
that de￿nes g. (That is, without knowing the trades that solve the above
problem for m 6= 1, the binding constraint gives us the payo￿s needed to
specify the value functions, which are those in the proof of proposition 1.)
Now we con￿rm that the strategies are optimal. 10 Because sc and the
value functions are those in Proposition 1, it follows from the proof of that
proposition that sc is optimal. As regards the strategies for pairwise meetings,
if both agents are truthful and say yes, then the planner’s proposal is an
optimal proposal by the buyer because of the Pareto form of the problem
that de￿nes g and the lower bound in (14). And, because the value functions
are those of Proposition 1, it is optimal for both agents to say yes. It remains
to show that agents tell the truth.
Consider ￿rst a buyer with m0  1 who makes an announcement m < m0
and with respective solutions (y0;x0) and (y;x). Also, let  = m0   m. If
10Again, the principle of one-period deviations can be invoked (see the last footnote).
14m  1, then the payo￿ to misrepresentation is
u(y) + wc(m
0   x) = u(y) + wc(m   x) + z =
u(~ y) + wc(m   1) + z = u(~ y) + wc(m





where the ￿rst and third equalities follow from the fact that wc is a￿ne, and
the second and fourth from constraint (14) at equality. If, instead, m < 1,
then the payo￿ to misrepresentation is
u(y) + wc(m
0   x) = u(0) + wc(m
0) <
u(~ y) + wc(m




where the equalities follow from (14) at equality, and the inequality follows
from the second inequality that de￿nes V .
Next, consider a buyer m0 < 1. Then the payo￿ to misrepresentation is
u(y) + wc(m





where both equalities follow from (14) at equality.
Finally, because the solution for g does not depend on the seller’s an-
nouncement, the seller cannot gain by making a false announcement. This
completes the proof of su￿ciency except for ~ y = 0, which is obviously CP
implementable.
This characterization implies our claim that if people are su￿ciently pa-
tient, then the ￿rst best is CP implementable. If they are, then as noted
above y  ymax, and we can CP implement y.
It may seem surprising that we can implement more allocations than can
be achieved under generalized Nash bargaining. In a static model, the set of
all such generalized Nash bargaining outcomes is the set of coalition-proof
allocations taking as given the agent endowments. Here, we can choose how
to divide the gains from trade as a function of the endowments, the money
holdings brought into the meeting. That additional freedom allows us to
implement more stationary allocations. 11
11See Zhu and Wallace 2007 for another application of such freedom.
15As we claimed, all of the above results carry over to the version with quasi-
linear stage-2 preferences, provided that they are consistent with a degenerate
distribution of money. If they are, then quasi-linear stage-2 preferences imply
an a￿ne wc function that di￿ers from the one above only by having a di￿erent
constant￿a constant that plays no role in any of the arguments above.
Finally, it is evident from our proofs that the ability of agents to hide
money does not restrict the set of IR or CP implementable allocations. For
CP implementability, this is due to the linearity (or quasi-linearity) of stage-
2 preferences, as can be seen in the proof of proposition 2. We should not
expect the same results to hold in more general models.
6 De￿ation and in￿ation
A standard exercise in the Lagos-Wright model is to study the e￿ects of
lump-sum taxes, positive or negative, levied in the centralized meeting, stage
2, and used to ￿nance interest on money, positive or negative. And, it is
standard to make the payment of that tax mandatory, not subject to any
no-commitment restriction.12 Here we take no-commitment into account by
making participation in the centralized meeting voluntary. In particular,
any agent can choose not to participate in the centralized meeting, while
continuing on into the next pairwise meeting. Because trading histories are
private, a person cannot be punished in the future for skipping the centralized
meeting.
Taxes are introduced in the following way. Someone who enters the cen-
tralized meeting with m units of money receives  units of money as a lump-
sum transfer (where  may be negative), and pays a tax such that after-tax
money holdings are given by m+
1+ . This is equivalent to letting the money
supply grow at rate  and normalizing all nominal quantities and prices by
the per capita stock of money. In particular, if the per capita nominal stock
of money satis￿es Mt+1 = (1+)Mt and m0 denotes an individual’s nonnor-
malized holding entering stage 2, then the post-transfer holding as a fraction
of Mt+1is m0+Mt
Mt+1 = m+
1+ , where m = m0
Mt. The nonnormalized price of money









t   1 =   
1+. The Friedman-rule is  =    1. In order to avoid the
12Since ￿rst formulating the material in this section, we have come across Andolfatto
(2008), which also departs from mandatory taxation.
16well-known indeterminacy at the Friedman rule, we study  >    1.
We begin with necessary conditions for IR implementability, the analogue
of lemma 1.
Lemma 2 If  >   1 and (y;z) is IR implementable, then g(1;1) = (y;1),
p = (1 + )z, and
w
t
p(1) = h(y) and w
t
c(m) = z(m   1) + w
t
p(1) for m 2 f0;1;2g: (15)
Proof. As in the proof of lemma 1, there is a simple IR equilibrium
consistent with (y;z). The bound on  implies that excess money is not
carried from one stage 2 to the next stage 2. That implies g(1;1) = (y;1),
which, in turn, implies that money holdings are in the set f0;1;2g at the
beginning of stage 2. And, in order that consumption at stage 2 be consistent
with the allocation (y;z) and that each person leave stage 2 with 1 unit of











 z if m = 0
0 if m = 1
z if m = 2
:
It follows that p = (1 + )z. The value-function conclusions in (15) follow.
Although this result does not cover the Friedman-rule rate-of-return, that
is not a concern. The usual treatment of that case is to select the g(1;1) =
(y;1) simple equilibrium from among many such equilibria for that case.
Given that selection, our proof extends to the Friedman-rule rate-of-return.
Because the games have to be amended in slightly di￿erent ways for the
de￿ation and in￿ation cases, we study those cases separately.
6.1 De￿ation
In this case, we present one result: if (y;z) is IR implementable with de￿ation,
then it is IR implementable with no de￿ation, with  = 0. This result and
proposition 2 imply that de￿ation is useless. Because the result pertains to
IR implementability, we here describe only how to amend that de￿nition to
permit consideration of a tax.
Planner proposal : a fourth object,  2 R , is added to what constitutes
a planner’s proposal in de￿nition 1.
17IR game: The part of the game for stage 1 is unchanged. At the con-
clusion of stage 1, each person chooses from fyes;nog, where yes means
proceeding to stage 2, the centralized meeting, and no means skipping it. If
yes is played, then the person is subject to the taxes implied by  and, as in
the no-tax game, chooses a budget-feasible trade at the price in the planner
proposal.
It may seem odd to tie paying the lump-sum tax to receiving a return
on money. After all, if there were actual de￿ation, then a person could
conceivably not pay the lump-sum tax, but still receive the return on money
implied by de￿ation. However, that kind of defection, which we do not
permit, would only further restrict what can be implemented.
IR strategy. This is unchanged except that we replace st





c1 : M !fyes;nog (the stage-2 participa-
tion choice) and s0t
c2 is de￿ned as was st
c with the budget implied by the tax
scheme.
The de￿nitions of equilibrium, simple equilibrium, and IR implementabil-
ity are not a￿ected. Now we can prove that de￿ation does not help.
Proposition 3 If  2 ( 1;0] and (y;z) is IR implementable, then (y;z) 2
V .
Proof. Suppose that (y;z) is IR implementable. Someone who enters a
pairwise meeting without money has the following option: with probability
1=N produce, acquire a unit of money, and enter the centralized meeting;











N   (N   1)
=
 c(y) + h(y)
N   (N   1)
; (17)
where the equality uses (15) (see lemma 2). But for IR implementability,
the payo￿ for someone who enters stage 2 without money and participates
in the centralized meeting, wc(0) as given by (15), must exceed that implied
by skipping the centralized meeting, wp(0). By (17), that requires
 z + h(y)  
 c(y) + h(y)
N   (N   1)
: (18)
18This is easily seen to be equivalent to the second inequality that de￿nes V .
And, because a seller with 1 unit of money in a pairwise meeting has no
trade as an option, we require  c(y) + wc(2)  wc(1). According to (15),
this is the ￿rst inequality that de￿nes V .
In principle, de￿ation can be bene￿cial because it transfers resources from
those without money to those who have money￿that is, from people who
were consumers in pairwise meetings to people who were producers. When
participation constraints are binding, in the sense that y > ymax, every-
one would be willing to commit to y before going to pairwise meetings, if
commitment were possible. But this means taking a gamble that involves
a net loss for someone who turns out to be a producer, and a gain for
someone who is a consumer, such that the expected gain outweighs the ex-
pected loss. When commitment is not possible, the producer would balk,
because c(y) < Ru(y), and the highest feasible output is then ymax, with
c(ymax) = z = Ru(ymax). If it were possible to enhance the value of money
in such a way as to retrieve some of the consumer’s gain in the pairwise
meeting and transfer it to the producer, then the participation constraint
could be relaxed. But when this constraint is binding, the consumer is in-
di￿erent between skipping the centralized meeting and exchanging z for a
unit of money in that meeting. Thus, any scheme that taxes the consumer
for participation in the centralized meeting is not feasible unless the tax can
be made mandatory. Indeed, no mattter what form of taxation might be
used, any such scheme implies some value of z￿to be produced by those
who were consumers in pairwise meetings and to be consumed by those who
were producers. Thus, the value functions are those given by Lemma 2, and
Proposition 3 applies. Therefore, when y > ymax, there is no feasible inter-
vention such that y > ymax unless participation in the centralized meeting is
mandatory.
Because we tie avoiding the tax to skipping the centralized meeting,
Proposition 3 uses linearity of preferences in the centralized meeting, rather
than quasi-linearity, in an essential way. But quasi-linearity does not, of
course, justify making the tax mandatory. Instead, it requires a more de-
tailed formulation of tax enforcement and how it is related to other activities
in the centralized meeting.
196.2 In￿ation
It is also standard to use versions of the Lagos-Wright model to provide a
positive analysis of the welfare costs of in￿ation. In order to have our tax
transfer scheme for  > 0 correspond to in￿ation, which holders of money
cannot avoid (except by holding less money), we here make stage-2 partici-
pation mandatory, in the sense that any money held by someone who skips
the centralized meeting becomes worthless. With that innocuous change, our
formulation is equivalent to the usual formulation with in￿ation.
To use the model to study the welfare e￿ects of in￿ation, we charac-
terize the set of IR and CP implementable allocations taking  2 R+ as
given. As we will see, the lump-sum transfer tends to reduce the set of IR
implementable allocations because it tempts people to leave the centralized
meeting without money in order to avoid the in￿ation tax.
We show that for  > 0, the set of IR implementable allocations is




N(1 + )   (N   1)
: (20)
Notice that (y;z) 2 V () if and only if y 2 [0;ymax()], where ymax() is
the unique positive solution for y to c(y) = R()u(y), with R(0) = R and
ymax(0) = ymax in terms of the notation used above. Clearly, R() is strictly
decreasing in  and R() ! 0 as  ! 1. It follows that ymax() is strictly
decreasing in  and that ymax() ! 0 as  ! 1. After we prove the claim
about IR implementable allocations, conclusions about CP implementable
allocations will follow immediately from the argument used to prove Propo-
sition 2.
The proof of the next proposition is almost identical to that of proposition
1.
Proposition 4 Given  2 R+, there exists z such that (y;z) is IR imple-
mentable if and only if y 2 [0;ymax()].
Proof. Necessity. At stage 1, defection to no-trade by a seller with 1 unit
of money assures a payo￿ no less than wc(1), while following g(1;1) = (y;1)
gives the seller  c(y) + wc(2). Thus, it must be the case that
c(y)  wc(2)   wc(1) = z, (21)
20where the equality follows from (15) (see lemma 2). This is the ￿rst inequality
that de￿nes V ().
Next, consider an agent who enters stage 2 with 0 money. A feasible
alternative to wc(0) is to leave stage 2 without money and to resume feasible
equilibrium actions starting at the next date. That such a deviation not be
undertaken requires








where the left side is the no-deviation payo￿ and the right side is the devia-
tion payo￿ including the payo￿ from consuming the value of the lump-sum
transfer,
p
1+ = z. By (15), (22) is equivalent to










Using the de￿nition of h(y), it is easily seen that this is the second inequality
that de￿nes V ().
Su￿ciency. Our candidates for g(1;m) and g(m;1) are the same as in the
proof of proposition 1 (see (7)). And, again, we propose that an equilibrium
strategy has sc(m) (consumption at stage 2) such that each person leaves
stage 2 with 1 unit of money. If the above trades are carried out, then
the initial degenerate distribution persists and the implied value functions
are given by the expressions in the proof of proposition 1 (see (8) and (9)).
To complete the proof, we have to show that these induce truth-telling and
playing yes at stage 1 and also induce the proposed stage-2 strategy.
Given g in (7), truthfulness is a weakly dominant strategy for everyone.
Now we show that a buyer with m  1 says yes and that any seller says yes.
For the former, we need to show that u(y) + wc(m   1)  wc(m) or by (8)
that u(y)  z. This follows from the second inequality that de￿nes V ().
For the latter, we need to show that  c(y) + wc(m + 1)  wc(m), which is
just the ￿rst inequality that de￿nes V ().
Now we show that the stage-2 proposed strategy, sc(m) = z(m   1),
is optimal for agents. We proceed by considering two exhaustive sets of
alternatives.
Case (i): sc(m) < z(m   1). This implies leaving stage 2 with more
than 1 unit of money. However, just as in the proof of lemma 1, this implies
carrying some money from the current stage 2 to the next stage 2, which is
not optimal.
21Case (ii): sc(m) > z(m   1). This implies leaving stage 2 with less than
1 unit of money. But, any amount of money less than one unit is not spent







= z(m + ):
According to (9), the implied payo￿ is










We have to show that this is weakly dominated by the payo￿ from choosing
sc(m) = z(m   1), which according to (9) is z(m   1)+ h(y). The required
inequality is equivalent to










which, in turn, is equivalent to inequality (23). But, as noted above, inequal-
ity (23) is equivalent to the second inequality that de￿nes V ().
Now we turn to CP implementability. There is an analogue of proposition
2 with ymax() in place of ymax.
Corollary 1 Given  2 R+, there exists z such that (y;z) is CP imple-
mentable if and only if y 2 [0;minfy;ymax()g].
The proof of the corollary follows exactly the logic of the proof of propo-
sition 2 except that ymax() replaces ymax. With this corollary in hand, we
can describe the implied welfare cost of in￿ation and how that cost compares
to those for given trading protocols.
In this model, it is reasonable to measure the welfare cost of in￿ation
by some increasing function of y   y, where y = minfy;ymax(0)g and y
is stage 1 output. If y is chosen optimally from the CP implementable set,
then y = minfy;ymax()g and the welfare cost of in￿ation is determined by
y   minfy;ymax()g.13 All the trading protocols that have been studied
give rise to IR implementable allocations and to y < y. It follows that
13If there were a revenue need that could only be met through in￿ation, then the planner
would want to choose the best CP implementable allocation.
22the implied stage-1 output found for a given trading protocol satis￿es y 
minfy;ymax()g. Therefore, as should be no surprise, the welfare cost we
￿nd is no greater than that found for any given protocol.
Lagos and Wright argue that if the in￿ation rate is slightly above the
Friedman-rule rate, and if the trading protocol is that buyers make take-it-
or-leave-it o￿ers to sellers, then the cost of in￿ation is small, by the envelope
theorem. Our result is quite di￿erent (and it has nothing to do with the
Friedman-rule). First, if y = y, then in￿ation has no cost, up to the point
where y = ymax(). Second, if y = ymax(0), meaning that the ￿rst-best
level of output cannot be achieved because the seller’s participation con-
straint is binding, then in￿ation has a ￿rst-order cost, because it exacerbates
this constraint.
Our result can be illustrated by reconsidering the cost of in￿ation in
the parameterized model discussed by Lagos and Wright (2005). The cost
and utility functions are given by c(y) = y and u(y) =
y1 
1  with  = 3
10, the
discount factor is  = 1
1:04, and the probability of a single-coincidence meeting
is 1
N = 1






. In the case of
the Nash bargaining protocol, Lagos and Wright obtain y = :442 when the
in￿ation rate is zero, and y = :143 when the in￿ation rate is 10%, implying a
large welfare cost. But for these parameter values we have ymax(0:1) = 1:41,
so that the ￿rst-best allocation is in the CP implementable set; in fact the
welfare cost is zero for in￿ation rates below 16.7%.
7 Concluding remarks
Our results imply that entire classes of trading protocols that have been
studied are missing good coalition-proof implementable allocations. There
is no reason to think that that result is limited to the Lagos-Wright model.
Thus, much hinges on whether we study all such allocations or choose a
particular class of trading protocols. Existing work also overstates the welfare
cost of in￿ation and the bene￿cial role of tax schemes used to ￿nance the
payment of interest on money. It overstates the bene￿cial role of such tax
schemes for two reasons. First, that work understates what can be achieved
without such tax schemes. Second, most of it fails to subject tax schemes to
restrictions like no-commitment and imperfect monitoring, the restrictions
that give money a role.
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